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In his classic book entitled Economics,' Nobel-Prize laureate Paul 
Samuelson summarized the economics involved in gambling activities as 
follows: 
There is ... a substantial economic case to be made 
against gambling. First, it involves simply sterile 
transfers oj money or goods between individuals, creaLing 
no new money or goods. Although it creates no output, 
gambling does nevertheless absorb time and resources. 
When pursued beyond the limits of recreation. where the 
main purpose after all is to "kill" time. gambling subtracts 
from the national income. The second economic 
disadvantage of gambling is the fact that it tcnds to 
promote inequality and insrability of illcomes. 2 
Furthermore, Professor Samuelson observed that "[j]ust as Malthus saw the 
law of diminishing returns as underlying his theory of population, so is the 
'Jaw of diminishing margi nal utility' used by many economists to condemn 
professional gambling.") 
The concern of the legalized gambling interests over "market 
saturation" is largely a non·issue. From the governmen tal perspective. 
focusing on this issue misdirects the economic debate, because fears of 
market saturation are predicated upon the unwarranted assumption that 
legalized gambling operations constitute regional economic development-· 
which they do not. In reality, legalized gambling operations consist 
primarily of a transfer of wealth from the many to the few··accompanied by 
the creation of new socio-economic negatives. From the perspective of the 
• This analysis deals only with discussions and proposals involving "lcgaIM g:lmbling 
activi ties and their socio-economic impacts . 
•• A.B. 1972. William & Mary: J. D. 1976, M.B.A. 1977. University of Georgia: 
LL.M. 1978, S.J.D. 1981, University of Virginia: Proressor. UniversIty of Il linois at Urbana-
Champaign. 
I. PAUL A. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 245 (lOth ed.). 
2. /d. al 425 (footnote omitted). 
3. Id. al 426. 
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legalized gambling industry. focusing on fears of market saluration largely 
constitutes an exercise in arguing over restricting potential competition 
and/or guaranteeing market segments via state statutes, instead of engaging 
in "pure competition" like most industries. 
These issues should first be examined from the strategic govern mental 
perspective. In this context, the inherently parasitic manner4 in which 
legalized gambling activities must apparently collect consumer dollars to 
sUIVives is frequently described as "cannibalism" of the pre-existing 
economy--including the pre-existing tourist industry.6 According to the 
skeptics of legalized gambling activities, this industry-specific phenomenon 
means that in comparison with most other industries. legalized gambling 
activities must a/oniori not only grow as rapidly as possible, but also grow 
as e)(pansively as possibJe.1 By 1993. the national business press was 
beginning to emphasize some of these points and predicted, for e)(ample, 
that "[p]reuy soon, investors and lenders will realize that the gambling 
bubble is about to burSI."g However, while the "economic bubble" could 
burst in some local areas. as of 1993 there still remained so many markets 
and slates without e)(tensive legalized gambling activities that the soc io-
economic negatives of legalized gambling activities could theoretically 
4. Sr:r: e.g., ROBERT GOODMAN. LEGALIZED GAMBLING AS A STRATEGY FOR 
EcoNOMIC DEVELOPMENT 51 (Clr. Econ. Dev., U. Mas5.-Amhersl 1994) CCannibaliz!ltion: 
The Diversion of Dollars From Existing Businesses to Gambling Enterprises·); FLA. DEP'T 
COM., IMPLICATIONS OF CASINO GAMBLING AS AN EcoNOMIC DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 
5, 6 (Bur. &on. Analysis 1994) (-cannibalization"); N.Y. Off. ST. COMPTROLLER, 
GAMBLING: To STAKE Sm.lImiiNG OF VALUE UPON AN UNCERTAIN EVENT (Off. Fiscal Res. 
& Pary Analysis 1994) (hereinafter N.Y. COMPTROLLER ANALYSIS); I. Nelson Rose. The 
Rise And Fall Of 11fr: Third lVavr:: Gambling Will Be Ourlawl'd ill Forry Yr:ars, in 
GAMBLING AND PUBLIC POLICY: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 65, 69 (1991) ("parasitic 
... industry"); Press Release, Aa. Dep', Com .. "Commerce Analysis: Casinos Bad Bet for 
Florida," $cpt. 19, 1994, at I ("cannibalization" of pre-eltisting tourism industry). Su 
generally Hearing on Iht! Nolional Impacl of Casino Gambling Pro/ijualion Before Ihr: 
Housr: Cot/lin. on Small Businr:ss, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (Sepl. 21,1994) (testimony of Prof. 
Robert Goodman, U. Mass.) {hereinafter Hr:aringj. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. See CHARLES T. CLoTFELTER & PHILLIP 1. COOK. SELLING HOPE 151-54 (Nat'l 
Bur. &on. Research, Harvard Univ. Press 1989). For example. "{i]f lotte ries are your only 
business. then you eltpand your business by legalizing lotteries, or by increasing 
participation in lotteries." ld. at 154. citing II representativc o f Scicntific Games, as quoted 
in L.A. Times. October 8, 1984. Obviously, any business would tend to reinvest in itself; 
however, in the instance of conccntratcd 1cgali7.ed gambling activities, this tendency can 
intensify the large socio-economic negatives which do not accompany other industries. 
8. Su Rita Koselka & Christopher Palmeri, Snoke Eyes. FOR8ES. Mar. I, 1993, at 
70, n. See also Rose, supra nOie 4. at 70, 82-83. 
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remain hidden for years until the "bubble bursf'--after perhaps 40 years.' 
In California and Nevada: Subsidy, Monopoly, and Competitive Effecls of 
Legalized Gambling,lO the California Governor's Office or Planning and 
Research highlighted in December or 1992 "the enormous subsidy that 
Californians provide to Nevada through their gambling patronage"1I and 
concluded that "Nevada deri ves an enormous competitive advantage from 
its monopoly on legal gambling. nl2 The report su mmarized that 
"[g]ambling by Cali fornians pumps nearly $3.8 billion per year into Nevada, 
and probably adds about $8.8 billion--and 196,000 jobs--to the Nevada 
economy, counting the secondary employment it generates"]) and that this 
was "a direct transfer of income and wealth rrom California to Nevada every 
year."I~ Thus, the Nevada economy appears to constitute a classic example 
of a legalized gambling economy "parasitically" draining or "cannibal izing" 
another economy (primarily Southern California). IS 
Arguably, these processes are intensified by the unique aspects involved 
in marketing the gambling philosophy, which include "selling 
hope"16--instead or goods and services. 17 Therefore , when legalized 
gambling organizations arc compared with traditional businesses and the 
industries they represent, the gambling organizations are generally more 
sensitive to fears of "market saturation. H While traditional businesses may 
aggressively compete for consumer dollars, by comparison, Ihe competition 
belween legalized gambling organizations for consumer doll ars can be 
fierce,ll because unlike traditional businesses, gambling organizations drain 
9. S~~ Rose, supra note 4. at 65. 70, 82-83. 
10. CAL. GoVERNOR'S Off. Pt.AN. & REsEARCIl. CALIFORNIA AND NEVADA; 
SUBSIDY, MONOPOLY, AND COMP,,--rmVE EFFECTS OF LEGALIZED GAMBUNO ES-I (Dec. 
1992) (hereinafter SUBSIDY ]. 
II. l d. 
12. fd. 
13. Id. 
14. ld. 
15. Se~ supra nOfes 4-6 and accompanying lext for funher infonnalion on the damages 
legalized gambling can do. 
16. Su g~Mrally CLolFEL."TER & CooK, supra note 7. 
17. It appean that Ihe "recreational gamblenM constitu ting approximatc1y 80% of the 
market (but spending only 3.5% of Ihe gambling dollan) are receiving a "service" even if 
they are receiving no product. Su John Warren Kindt, TM Economic ImpdCIS of ugalil.~d 
Gambling ACtiVl/iu, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 51, 60-61 (1994). It should be noted, however, that 
only approx imately 3.5% of each gambling dollar falls into this clllcgory. beclluse the other 
20% of gamblers (spending 65% of the gambling dollars) are definitely gambling beyond Ihe 
limits of "recreationM ··with the concomitant economic impacts predicted by Samuclson. fd. 
at 60-70. Su also supra nOfes 1-3 and accompanying text for further information. 
18. See Rose, supra nO{e 4. at 69. -Competilion for the gambling dollar is fieree." 
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local and state economies of consumer dollars by pulling them like an 
economic "black hole"19 into gambling parlors and the "cluster services" 
(i.e" "closely-associated" hotels and restaurants) supporting the gambling 
parlors. For example, when the legalization of riverboat gambling was 
debated in Illinois, certain gambling maxims were highlighted to the Illinois 
Senate Committee conducting hearings. 
OUf [Nevada] casinos can win because they have long 
lenn traditions and years of experience at the game. They 
can and do entrap the garners in a total gaming ambiance 
which includes a full range of complimentary services, not 
the least of which in effect producing behaviors is a free 
and unlimited flow of alcoholic beverages. Extensive 
credit is also provided for players. And the casinos have 
high stakes games. High stakes can be won by the player. 
High stakes can be lost by the player. The best gamblers 
know when to quit. The casinos are designed to persuade 
the good gamblers not to quit, certainly not to quit when 
they are ahead, or when behind if they have more 
resources to gamble. Money management is the 
obligation of the player, and the casino tries very hard to 
have the player avoid this obligation. This is why the 
casinos win from the players. This is why we are 
building three new casino hOlels with 4000 rooms each [in 
Las Vegas].20 
These phenomena lend tangential support to arguments that when legalized 
gambling enters an economy, the consumer dollars spent on gambling 
activities result in a net drain and are usually not generating net new orders 
for durable and nondurable goods in the pre-existing traditional economy.21 
The basic principle at work in most legalized gambling scenarios is that 
"when local people substitute spending on gambling for their other 
expenditures, this induced impact has a negative multiplier effect of 
decreasing spending on other forms of recreation and businesses in the 
/d. Su gmually, VICKI ART, JAMES F. SMITH, & EUGENE M. CHRISTIANSEN, THE 
BUSINESS OF RISK: COMMERCIAL GAMBLING IN MAINSTREAM AMERICA (1985). 
19. Alf Siewers, Ccuino ilopes and Jew$, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Apr. 12. 1992, at 1,67 
(citing to L Nelson Rose, Whittier Law School). 
20. Hewi"f(s on S.B. 572 Before the Ill. Sen. Comm. on Riverboat Gambling, at 3 
(1989) Jhereinafter Hearingsj (statement of William Thompson, Professor of Mgmt. & Pub. 
Admin., University of Nevada, Las Vegas). 
21. GOODMAN, supra note 4, at 50. 
-
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area ... 22 The gambling interests argue that the dollars they take in are 
"entertainmen t dollars" or "recreational dollars." This observation is valid 
with regard to approx.imately 35% of the "gambling dollar," but it is invalid 
with regard to the remaining 65%.23 Opponents of legalized gambling 
argue that there are also differences because the entertainment dollars spent 
on a movie, for example, largely generate more movies, and recreation 
dollars spent on a speedboat. for example, largely generate orders for more 
speedboats. Accordingly, while most entertainment or recreational dollars 
contribute to a positive multiplier effect. legalized gambling dollars result 
in a negative multiplier effect. ~ This negative impact apparently occurs. 
in part, because approxi mately two-thirds of the gambling dollars are not 
recreationally-orienled, but are spent by a compulsive market segl1lene~ 
reacting to an addictive activity--probable or possible pathological 
gambling--as delimited by the American Psychiatric Association.26 
Opponents also note that gambling dollars spent in a legalized gambling 
facility are usuall y reinvested in more gambling facilities·-which just 
intensifies the socio-economic negatives associated with gambling activities 
and "reduces the national income" even funher.v 
Notably, gambling "winnings" to one gambler do not come from the 
gambling parlor but from the pockets of other gamblers. Since dollar 
winnings (and nOI entertainment enjoyments) constitute the rationa le for 
many gamblers to gamble, the gamblers in this category are not provided 
entertainment per se when they gamble. Furthermore. skeptics question 
whether a person who earns $30,000 per year really experiences $3,000 
worth of "entertainment" when that $3.000 is lost in one night. 
A summary of these concepts reveals that when compared to legalized 
gambling parlors, pre-existing entertainment activities in the United States 
generally create and contribute 10 a positive economic cycle, and they do not 
leave behind the enonnous social problems inherent in gambling economies. 
As previously mentioned. an exception appears to occur when a small 
gambling economy is subsidized by a large non-gambling economy (for 
example, Nevada vis-a-vis Califomia). 18 However, when viewed from the 
22. [d. 
23. &t Kindt. slipra nole 17 and accompanying text. 
24. GoooMAN, slipra note 4. alSO. 
25. &t!, t.g., Kindt, slipra note 17, at 60-61. 
26. AM. PsYCHIATRIC ASS'N. D .... GNOSTIC AND STATISTICAl. MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS § 312.31. at 324-25 (3d ~Y. ed. 1987). 
27 . Su SAMU~N, slipra note 1.31425; St!t! also CUrrfELTER & COOK. supra note 
7. 
28. Su, t .g .. SUBSIOY, supra Il(){e 10. 
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proper perspective, whether regional or strategic in scope, legali zed 
gambling activities always drain the relevant economic base. For example, 
it was emphasized to the Illinois Senate Committee on riverboat gambling 
that "[t]he money spent on riverboats will be drained off other portions of 
the Illinois economy."29 Similarly, "Iowa [erroneouslyJ thought it would 
have a monopoly with its riverboat gambling, a parasitic casino industry 
growing fat orf the Chicago markel."30 
In an economic scenario. dollars spent in gambling parlors are often 
removed from circulation. and Ihis process contributes to a negative 
economic impact.3] Most revenues to the legalizcd gambling organizations 
must necessarily be directed primarily into attracting new consumer markets 
or toward increased marketing efforts to keep "selling hope"n to 
pre-existing gamblers.)) Gambling organizations argue that spending 
dollars on, for example, slot-machines is spending money on durable goods, 
but once again, sk.eptics counter that the industry is predicated upon policies 
which keep their dollars "in-house"l4 and that even the manufacturing 
orders for gambling-oriented machines only constitute orders to the "cluster 
services." Furthermore, it is argued that gambling-oriented machines 
perform no useful task. and therefore national, as well as local, productive 
capacity is better directed toward manufacturing appliances or other 
machines. 
Once again, the net result according to Professor Jack Van Oer Slik, 
who echoed the sentiments of much of the academic community, was that 
29. Hearings. supra note 20. al 6. 
30. Rose. supra note 4, al 69. TheoTetically. the negative economic spiral can only 
be overcome by large numbers of tourists from outside of the locali7.ed economy. In Nevada, 
for e:umplc, over 90% of the tourists are from out of state. Hearings. supra note 20. at .5. 
This "tourist factor" generally requires that 50-94% of the gambling patrons must 
come from outside of the localized economy. Moreover. these to\lriS[~ call110I be pre-existing 
tourists visiting non-gambling to\lri~t attractions. For example. in Niagara Falls, New York. 
the introduction of legalized gambling. such as casino gambling would basically thrive off 
of the [0% of the pre-existing tourist dollars who would definitely gamble and another 42% 
who would "tend to gamble" in the casinos. In OIher words. 10-52% of the pre-existing 
tourist dollars would leave the pre-existing touristlrade and migrate to the casinos. See. e.g .. 
Kindt, supra note 17. at 60-70. 
31. Me $upra notes 19-26 and accompanying texi. 
32. SI!t gel1erally CLOTFELTER & COOK, supra note 7; HearingJ. supra note 20. at 3. 
33. For analyses relating to the psychological aspects of why people will gamblc and 
will continue to gamble. ue Igor Kusy~yn, The Psychology of Gambling. 474 M'NALS A, ... 1. 
ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 133 (1984); Ellen J. Langer, The P$ychology of Chalice. 7 J. 
nIEORY Soc. BEIIAV. 185 (1978); Richard N. Roset!. Gambling and Rationality. 73 J. POL. 
EcON . .595 (196.5). 
34. Set Htarings. supra note 20. at 3 aoo accompanying text. 
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state-sanctioned "gambling produces no product, no new wealth, and so it 
makes no genuine contribution to economic developmenl. ,,3S Similarly. in 
1989 Professor William Thompson cautioned that Illinois riverboat gambl ing 
would "not be a catalyst for general economic development."36 Of course, 
if the focus is only on a localized gambling area, such as Las Vegas, 
instead of the proper perspective 0 11 the overall region Las Vegas is 
draini ng, th ere can be the illusion of an overall positive economic impact.)7 
Most insidious to traditional businesses and to the rest of the economy, 
practically all of the dollars flowing into gambling organizations are 
"reinvested" in more and newer and "harder" forms (i.e., "more thrill ing" 
forms)JS of gambling, as well as their associated cluster services. This 
process tends continually to intensify the large socio-economic negatives (as 
well as the local positives) associated with legalized gambling activities. In 
other words, the truism "gambling begets gambling")9 appears accurate, and 
the gambli ng dollars are almost exclusively kept "in-house ,,4(1 despite the 
protestations of the gambling supporters to the contrary.41 
35. Jack. R. Van Ocr Slik., Legalized gambling: predatory policy, ILL. ISSUES. Mar. 
1990. at 30. 30. 
36. Hearillgs, supra note 20, at 6. 
37. See generally SUBSIDY. SI/pra nole 10. 
38. For an analysis of the H thril1 faetor H or "sensation seeking in gamblers. H see Kenny 
R. Coventry & R. lain F. Drown, Sensa/iOIl Seeking in Gamblers and NOII·Gamblers alld its 
Rdalion To Preference jor Gambling Ac/ivi/ies, Chasing. Arousal alld Loss of Control in 
Regu.lar Gamblers, in GAMBU:-iG BEHAVIOR AND PROBLE.\t GAMBU:-iG 25 (1993). 
39. Rose, sl/pra nole 4, al 69. 
40. See Hearings, mpra nOle 20, al 3. 
41. These economic faclors which are unique 10 legalized gambling organizations, 
arguably make it inappropriate 10 Ulili1.c the economic muhipliers provided by the Bureau 
of Economic Analysis of lhe U.S. Department of Commerce. Legalized gambling activities 
need their own sets of multipliers because legalized gambling activities have special aspects 
associated with them. In many instances, the nationwide growth of legalized gambling 
activities during the 1990s has basically stancd from zero, and therefore. the historical data 
bases essential for establishing and recalculating the proper economic multipliers are largely 
unavailable. In the interim. the legalized gambling organi1.3tions have had to be viewed as 
trnditional businesses without inculcating the industry-specific negatives unique to legalized 
gambling, and accordingly. economic multipliers have often been utilized without considering 
the negatives. See, e.g., ILL. EcON. & FISCAL COMM'N. WAGERING IN ILLINOIS 6 (1992) 
(hereinafter ILL. Eco:-". CmiM'NJ. In this report, for example, more calculations. 
illustrations, and explanations of the multipliers and input-out models which were utilized 
should have been presented. Id. at 36, 52-58 (omitting the mulliplier calculations, but giving 
the resulls). These omissions may have been an oversight, but the tenor of the report reflects 
a type of uneasiness with the positives thai the multipliers tend to highlight. For example, 
the report opines thaI "11]0 apply the Stale multipliers 10 the Lottery, in our opinion. would 
lend 10 overstate its impact on other sectors of the Illinois economy," Id. at 1 1. This 
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The drain on economics is real, but obviously, the bigger the economy 
of the anticipated gambling markel, the longer this draining can occur 
without being noticed by the public. In fact, il could transpire over a course 
of years if the market was big enough and unsaturated by competition from 
other gambling intcrests. These principles highlight some of the reasons that 
the legalized gambling interests were anxious42 to locate a $2-billion casino 
complex in the heart of Chicago. which has a huge economy and a large 
population base which can be tapped.43 It also reinforces claims by 
gambl ing opponents that these same casino interests were largely 
uneasiness adds to the credibility of the report and its authors. This report evidences that it 
is probably beginning to recognize some of the problems inherent in applying economic 
multipliers to legalized gambling. For updated analyses re lating to this 1992 report. su ILL. 
EcoN. & FISCAl. COMM'N. WAGERING IN ILLINOIS: A REPORT UPDATING THE EcoSOMIC 
iMPACT OF GAMBLING AcnVITJES (1994) Ihereinafter ILL. EcoN. COMM'N UPOATE 1994 1. 
Accordingly, the standard economic multipliers need to be specialized and 
recalculated to incorporate thc negative as well as the positivc economic impacts unique to 
legalized gambling activities. As of 1993, the relevant data was still in the process of being 
generated, but in the interim, all economic multipliers applied to legaii7.ed gambling activities 
should be accompanied by a caI'eal. Id. al 6. 
The field research and thc computer models in progress by Economics Professor Earl 
Grinols of the University of Illinois have led the field in these issue areas. 
For a localized example recommending thaI the specialized New Jersey multipliers 
be updatcd and indicating thc diffieultics of accomplishing this task, see N.J. GoVERNOR'S 
Anv. COMM'N ON GAM8U,,"G. REPORT AND RECOMMENDAnONs (1988) [hereinafter N.J. 
AOV. COM~fNl. 
42. SrI' Fran Spielman, Casino Ultimmurn, CIIl. SUN·TlMES. July 10, 1992, al I. 34. 
Among otner promises, "casino developers ... offered to offset losses incurred by the horse 
racing industry by subsidizing a S25 million tax break or by making raeetrack owners a 
'fourth partner' in their proposed 52 billion casino/entertainment complex in downtown 
Chicago." Jd. at I. 34. It was reported that offers from thc casino sponsors not to competc 
or to waive the sports betting aspects of the casino complex were also apparently convcyed 
10 the legalized racing interests by Caesars World President J. Terrence Lanni. Lanni 
portrayed the offer as a life prescrver to a dying industry. 
"If we lose this proposal and you never see me again. the racing industry will be 
dcad in Illinois before the turn of the century," he said. "Thc racing industry necds 
something. Our proposal and the money they would make from it would allow that 
industry to flourish and grow." 
Tom Carey. president and general manager of Hawthorne Racecourse, 
called Lanni's prediction "ridiculous." 
Id. at 34. 
43. The relevant populations to be considered would include. for example; Chicago 
at 2.8 million, Cook County at S.I million. DuPage County at .78 million, and nearby 
populations in other states. BUR. CENSUS. U.S. DEP'T COM., 1990 CENsuS, as reported in 
THE WORLD ALMANAC 406, 432·33 (1993). Of course. the Chicago popUlation is subsumed 
in thc Cook County numbers. 
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posturing" when they indicated that they wou ld build a similar project in 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin,43 or Gary, Indiana46 if Illinois did not approve a 
Chicago casino complex. In other words, the population demographics and 
the size of the local economies were much less favorable than those of 
Chicago.47 According to skeptics, the Chicago casino interests were 
hesitant about locating scaled·down casinos in Milwaukee or Gary, because 
the project's supporters recognized that with enough public relations 
hyperbole, they would probably eventually gain approval for their Chicago 
casino complex and they did not want to compete with themselves··at least, 
initially. Of course, if the Chicago situs was ever ruled out as an option for 
the foreseeable future, then scaled..ctown casinos (or even riverboats) in 
Milwaukee or Northern Indiana would become the ollly alternatives for the 
legalized gambling interests. 
According 10 critics, the gambling interests recognize that the 
proliferation of the gambling philosophy nationwide,48 which those 
inlerests have spent large public relations dollars to promote,49 constitutes 
a type of salvation for the industry.5(I Localized gambling organizations 
have difficulties once they have saturated the local markel,31 because by 
definition they almost invariably generate a negative economic spira1.32 
The negative economic impacts have repeatedly been described as a "black 
hole" of economics~) because legalized gambling organizations can take 
large dollar amounts oul of local and/or regional economies,34 such as $1 
44. Ste Spieim.1n, supra note 42, at I, 37. 
45. The population of Milwaukee. Wisconsin is 628,OOCI. THE WORLD ALMANAC 428 
(1993). 
46. The population of Gary, Indiana is 117,000. [d. at 408. 
47. Due to its central·location, a casino complex in Chicago could tap all of the 
relevant population bases. whereas a casino in Milwaukee, Wisconsin or Gary, Indiana would 
be on the outskirts of the prime population areas. &e supra notes 43-46 and accompanying 
text. 
48. Set generally Rose, supra nOle 4. 
49. For example. $16.5 million was spent 10 promote casino-style gambling in Florida 
in 1994. Louis Lavelle. Voters deal loss 10 casillos: Gamblillg backers lou despitt $16.5 
mil/ioll campaign. TAMPA TRIBUNE (Tampa. Fla.). Nov. 9, 1994. at I, 5: Casinos gamble, 
and lost, again, FLoRIDA SUN, Nov. 9. 1994, § A, at I. 6 (SI6.7 million spent by casino 
proponents in Florida). 
SO. See gelll.'rally Rose, supra note 4. 
~l. Su, t.g., ILL ECON. COMM'N UPDATE 1994. sf.lpm note 41. at 6, 9-10. 
52. See SAMUELSON, supra note I. at 425; Set also supra notes 19-26 and 
accompanying text. 
53. Siewers, supra note 19, at 1,67; I. Nelson Rose, Gambling And The Low--Updale: 
19924·5 (1992) (unpublisl'led article, available from J. Nelson Rose, Whinier Law School). 
54. Set, e.g .. Alf Siewers, $1 Billion Gambled Away on Riverboats: Ripplt Effect of 
'" 
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billion lost on llIinois riverboats in 1994.55 For example, when a "casino 
is located in a closed community [that is, without massive tourism], it acts 
like a black hole. suck ing the money out of the local population."s6 
Furthermore, "[alround the world and throughout history every society that 
has allowed casinos to cater to local customers has eventually outlawed 
gambling."57 
Generally, the expansion of gambling is accomplished in two basic 
ways. Arguably, one method is for the marketing techniques to become 
increasingly seductive.~8 However, before employing this methodology, the 
gambling interests will typically try to go to theoretically "harder and 
harder" forms of gambling, which can be broadly defined as those forms of 
gambling which sociologists calculate have more of a "thrill" factor 
interfacing with mechanisms to "chum" the gambling dollar as quickly as 
possible in the gambling environment. These forms of gambling run the 
gambit59 to follow "the domino effect"60 from the state Ioltery. to what 
legalized gambling interests can specifically control; that is, to dog and 
horse tracks, to off-track betting parlors, to riverboat gambling, to 
land-based casino gambling, to in-store video-machine gambling. to in-home 
Rilwboals, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Oct. 2, 1994, at I, 18. "Gamblers lost nearly SI billion on 
Illinois riverboats from August, 1993, to Sept. I of, .. [1994]." Id. at J. 
55. [d. Of course, some of this S I billion was resiphoned into local communities to 
pay for local goods and services, as well as wages. These expenditure, would apparently 
assist local economies. except that these doll:lrs were already assisting the local economy as 
"consumer dollars" before they were trJnsfonned into "gambling dollars." Once again, it 
should be noted that massive numbers of new tourists are required for local economics to 
break even. See $rwra note 30 and accompanying text. 
56. Rose, supra note 53, at 4-5. 
57, Id. at 5, referencing, SCARNE, SCARNE'S COMPLETE GUIDE TO GAMBUNG 215 
(1961). 
58. See, e.g., Nancy Millman, A Liftl!'! LoIIO means a 10/ in liard-sell ad camlmign, 
CHI. TRlB., Aug. 2, 1992, § 7C, at I. 2. "Historically, the [Illinoisliottery's weak.cst game, 
Little Lotto was recommended for the scrap heap by several ... ad agencies .. . . ,. Id. This 
game generatcd new sales by advertising "the odds be with you." Id. at 2. Of ~"Ourse, if this 
advertising had been other than slate-~nctioned, it would allegedly have constituted 
misleading advertising. Set also Mich. AII'y Gen. Frank J. Kelley. Address at the Int'l 
Conference on Gambling (Fcb. 11, 1994). For several examples of statc "advertising that, .. 
is deceitful and corrosive," see Joshua Wolf Shenk, Everyone's a Loser: How lotlery ads 
entice lite wrong people /0 gamble, WASH. MONTHLY, July-Aug. 1995, at 22, 22. For 
proposed fedenll legislation "[TJo assure that advertisements by slates for participation in 
their 10lleries are subject to regulation by the Fl':deral Trade Commission" (i.e .. truth-in-
advcrtising standards), see H.R. 327, l04th Cong., 1st Scss. (1995) (introduced by U.S. 
Representative Jim McCrery). 
59. See, e.g., Rose, supra nolc 4. at 67-69. 
60. [d. at 68. 
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video gambling, 10 a never·ending process of increased mechanisms to 
"chum" the gambling dollar faster until it is left within the gambling 
environment.'l Furthennore. it is a fundamental economic principle that: 
"Actually, in all professional gambling arrangements. the participants lose 
out on balance. The leakage comes from the fact that the odds are always 
rigged in favor of the 'house,' so that even an 'honest' house will win in 
the long run."62 Accordingly. if any given gambling interest can control 
more than one of the major categories of legalized gambling, it is lucrative 
to do so. If control cannot be maintained over more than onc category, the 
gambling organizations must go 10 "harder and harder" ronns of gambling 
within each category to increase the "thrill,,61 by changing or prolirerating 
61. For examples of the debates involving the migration of gambling dollars. s~e D, 
WEINSTEIN & 1.... DEITCH, THE IMPACT OF LEGAUZEO GAMBUNO: THE SOOO6CONOMIC 
COSSEQUE."ICES OF I..OTTEJUE5 AND OFF-l"RACK BETTING (1974); 0 , David Gulley & Frank 
A, Scon, Jr" Lottery £jJeclS on Pari,Mutunl Tax Rl!\~nuu, 42 NAT'l TAX J . 89 ( 1989); John 
A. Mikesell, Th~ Effect of Mammy and ComfUtjtion on Stalt Lolltry Marlcets, 6 J. Pot.. 'y 
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 251 (1987); William F. Reed, Fading Fasl: Thorollghbred racing In Ih~ 
U.S, is ~ing 11m in/o the grollnd by ofllrack bt'lting and other legaliud gambling. SPORTS 
ILLUSTRATED, Apr. 22, 1991, at 90; Susan A. Simmons & Robert Sharp. Stare l .. hI/eries· 
}:,"ffects on Thoroughbred Horse Racing, 6 J. POL' Y ANALYSIS & MANAGEMENT 446 (1987). 
See also Ctr. Bus. & &on. Res .. C. Bus. & &on .. U. Ky., Understanding the Impact of the 
Equine Industry in Kentucky and the Central Bluegrass (Spring 1992). See generally 
Bernstein, A Critique o(Thalheimer's Analysis of New Jersey RllCing (DePaul Vniv., Dep't 
Eton. 1992) (apparently sponsored by the proponents of legaliz.ed casino gambling in 
Chicago). 
62. SAMUElSON, supm note I, at 425 n.6. Despite Professor Samuelson's reference 
to illegal gambling activities, all references in this analysis IIrc to " 1cglll~ gambling activities. 
Discussions of any 311egedly illeglll activities and their impacts are beyond the scope of the 
present analysis. 
63, For discussLons involVing the mterface between risk and choice, :r~e R, HOOARTH, 
JUOGMf.NT AND Cl-fOtCE (1980); Milton Friedman & L J. Savage. The Utility A.nalysis of 
Choius inl'OlI'ing Risk. 56 1. PoL EcoN. 219 (1948): Damel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, 
Prosp.«t Theory: An Analysis of DecISIon under Risk, 41 EcoNOMETlUCA 263 (1 979); see 
also Ellen 1. Langer, The Illusion of Control, 32 J. PERsOSAUfV & Soc. PsVCHOL 311 
(1975), Set genemlly U. Roy Kaplan, Gambling among Lot/ery Winners: B~fore and After 
Ihe Big Score, 4 J. GAMBUNG BElIAV. 171 (1988). 
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the games.64 Some common techniques for increasing the thrill of the 
gambling itself include raising the betting limits, changing the game 
slightly,63 or enhancing the glitZ.66 Techniques for increasing the Ihri11 
of the gambling environment include providing shows and promoting open 
liquor licenses.61 According to critics of legalized gambling activities, if 
Ihis process ever SlOpS, the gambling organization stagnates by feeding only 
64. This essential process of changing and proJifcr<lting the games can be readily 
demonstrated in state loueries. ILL. ECON. COMM'N, supra notc 41, at 65 (Table); ILL. 
EcoN. COMM'N UPDATE 1994, supra note 41, at 17 (Table). 
Fiscal 
Year 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
[d. 
LOITERY SALES BY GAME, TOTAL SALES, TRANSFERS 
AND PROFIT MARGIN FY 1975-FY 1993 
50 cents 
and $1 
$129 
$107 
$ 50 
$32 
$ 20 
$ 14 
$ 8 
$57 
$63 
$58 
$ 56 
$ 41 
$ 43 
$ 78 
$158 
$197 
$234 
$238 
$227 
$260 
$322 
$341 
$365 
$406 
$493 
$ 42 
$164 
$248 
$284 
$367 
$356 
$348 
5335 
$353 
5370 
$383 
$369 
$362 
$348 
Pick 
Four 
$ 18 
$ 46 
$ 49 
$75 
$88 
$ 93 
$106 
$ 19 
$1 14 
$109 
$112 
$112 
$ 27 
$299 
$567 
$642 
$679 
$601 
$607 
$589 
$601 
$634 
$490 
Little 
Lotto 
$ 16 
$164 
$144 
$123 
$123 
$130 
Total 
Sales 
$ 129 
$ 164 
$ 133 
$ 90 
S 76 
S 97 
$ 215 
$ 344 
$ 515 
$ 912 
$1,232 
$1,316 
$1,334 
$1,336 
$1,482 
$1,571 
$1,567 
$1.637 
SU73 
Lollery 
Trans. 
$54 
$78 
S 41 
$33 
$32 
532 
$ 69 
$138 
$215 
$358 
$506 
$552 
$553 
$524 
$586 
$594 
$580 
5610 
$588 
Profit 
Margin 
41.9% 
47.6% 
41,6% 
36,7% 
42.1% 
33.0% 
32.1% 
40.1% 
41.7% 
39.3% 
41.1% 
41.9% 
41.5% 
39.2% 
39.5% 
37.8% 
37.0% 
37.3% 
37.4% 
Regardless of the~e attempts to keep growing. 11 of the 34 slllte lotleries exisling 
in 1991 (including Washington, D.C.) showed declines in 1991. Millman, supra note 58, al 
2. 
65. With regard \0 Ihe ll1inois lottery in 1992, the State commissioned the Bozell 
Company of Chicago to conduct the first major segmentation study ror a state lottery. "Thc 
study revealed that even within a category such as instant games. different players gravitate 
to sports games, casino tickets or the more rancirul instants like a 'trellsure hunt' .. 
Millman. supra note 58, at 2. 
66. [d. For an analysis of how these tcchniques interface with compulsive gambling, 
see Henry R. Lesieur, Compulsive Gambling, SOCIETY, May/June 1992, at 43, 43-44. 
67. See id.: Hearings, supra note 20, at 3. 
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off of problem gamblers who will eventually lose everything and be 
financiallyexhausted. 6S 
Typically, a state lottery constitutes the softest form of legalized 
gambling, because the time-lag between placing a bet and learning the 
results is often measured in days.69 However, even in a state where the 
louery is the only form of legalized gambling, the "pots" must keep 
increasing and the "lottery games" must keep changing to attract the 52 
percent (or more) of the public which can be enticed into gambling.70 
Even so, a percentage of the public can be initially enticed to gamble 
regardless of the games available and these "compulsive economic 
gamblers" constitute 1.5-5% of the publie after the "legalization" of 
gambling, but only. 77% of the public if there is no legalized gambling.71 
In 1979, for example, Governor James Thompson of Illinois publicly 
suggested that the state lottery which had been selling tickets since July of 
1974 would have to be eliminated if more people did not gamble. 72 The 
so-called "salvation" of the Illinois state lottery was the initiation in 1980 of 
a daily numbers game,73 which was followed by "Pick Four" in 1982, 
"Lotto" in 1983, and "Little Louo" in 1988.74 
This simple illustration demonstrates how even the softer forms of 
gambling must continually expand to survive because gambling interests are 
really selling nothing but "hope," and this hope is never realized in the 
long-tenn because "the house always wins eventually.,,75 Importantly, it 
should also be noted that the states directly and indirectly hide the true odds 
of winning from the public.i6 This policy hurts the credibility of elected 
governmental officials and of government in general.77 The advertising 
68. "[MJany players go broke. a mathematical certainty known as 'gambler's ruin.'" 
Rose, supra note 53, at 4. 
69. The less the time-lag between the bet and the results, the more Ihe money ~chums~ 
and the faster it stays with the house. Generany. more of the '·thrill" factor or "chase" factor 
is also prescnt. Therefore, state lotteries will tend toward reducing the time-lag and 
pcrmilling more "instant games" and video lottery tCITl1inals, which minimize the time-lag. 
70. ILL. EcON. COMM' N, supra note 41, at 65 (Table); ILL. EcON. COMM'N UPDATE 
1994, supra note 41, at 17 (Table); see CLOTFELTER & COOK, supra note 7, 11192-93; see 
also Mark Edward Stover, Contiguous Stale Lol/erie:;: Subslitutes on Campleme/lls? 9 J. 
PoL'y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 565 (1990). 
71. See CLOTFELTER & COOK, supra note 7, at t24·25; Kindt. supra note 17. at 64-65. 
72. CLOTFELTER & COOK. supra nOle 7. at 5,6. 
71 /d. at 6. 
74. ILL. EcON. COM\.l'N, supra note 41, at 65 (Table); ILL. ECON. COMM'N UPDATE, 
supra note 41, at 17 (Table). 
75. Rose, supra note 53, at 4. 
76. See Kelley, supra nOle 58. 
77. Id. 
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associated with state lotteries also directly attacks the principle that "a public 
office is a public truSI. ,,7t However. the advertising for all types of 
legalized gambling interests must necessarily become harder and 
increasingly misleading.'" By definition, this process can never stop until 
the legalized gambling once again becomes illegal, or until the relevant 
economy is so completely drained that the economy si nks into a recession. 
or even a localized depression. 
The process of a state deceiving its own citizenry was again 
demonstrated by the State of Illinois in its 1992 campaign to entice the 
public into playing a revised "game": namely. Little Lotto. This game was 
touted by the marketing gimmick. "the Wizard of Odds," who breathlessly 
announced "the odds be with you."so Of cou rse , this was untrue. The odds 
are never with the gambler.sl This example re-emphasized that Slate 
governments must utilize more and more deceit and harder and harder 
gimmicks to keep the public "piaying. ,,81 
From the perspective of public policy, state-sanctioned methods of 
misleading the public involving the odds of winning lotteries undermi ne the 
basic tenet s of good government. But for legalized gambling to survive, 
these techniques must necessarily continue to increase in scope and 
intensity.u As distinguished from this state-sanctioned advertising of the 
lotteries, any "business person" utilizing such advertisi ng would allegedly 
be engaged in frnud. 1I4 Gambling and the gambling philosophy, and the 
marketing techniques which must be utilized to supportlhese phil osophies, 
are directly opposed to sound business principles and economic 
development. Accordingly, elected governmental officials need to 
re-examine their infatuation with gambling and the gambling philosophy. 
Since the inception of the Flamingo casino in 1942,8.~ major legalized 
78. President Grover Cleveland. ;'1 JOliN BARll..",,·, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 77 1 n.1 
(14th ed. 1968). The Cleveland Administralion utilized this phrase as ils mollo. Id. This 
principle was also referenced by Matthew Henry. Edmund Burke. ThomJs Jefferson, Henry 
Clay, John C. Calhoun, and Charlcs Sumner. Id. al 386, 45<1, 472. 538, 545, 659. 
79. See supra noles 58-67 and accompanying tcxt. 
SO. Millman. supra note 58, al 1.2. Ste also Kelley, sllpm note 58: Shenk, supm nolC 
58, at 22-25. 
81. See gel/erully Jeryl L. Mumpower. Lottery Game.· and Risky Tec!//w/og;es: 
Communication.f About Low-l'robabilityIHigh-Conseqll(!llce Events, 8 RISK ANALYSIS 231 
(1988). 
82. /rl.; Rose, supra note 4. at 67-69. 
83. Ste Rose. supra nole 4. III 67-69. 
84. Ste Kelley, supra nOle 58; Shenk, supra note 58, al 22. 
85. Various forms of gambling were first legalized in Nevada in 1931. Ste 
CWfFELT£R & COOK, sf/pra note 7, ul 41. See genemlly Mark H. Haller, The Changing 
, 
, 
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gambling in Nevada has usually helped that state's economy, because until 
1977 Nevada was the only place for legalized casino gambling in the United 
States. Nevada attracted many "tourists," including compulsive gamblers 
(.77-5% of the population), problem economic gamblerss6 (10%),87 and 
others (42%).88 Due to the geogmphic distances involved, the 1976 advent 
of casino gambling in Atlantic City. New Jersey, probably impacted only 
slightly on the Nevada economy--except for the impact of losing the 
compulsive gamblers then being generated in the areas of Pennsylvania. 
New Jersey. and New York. 
However, the proliferation of slate lotteries during the 1980's generated 
real fears among the Nevada gambling interests of "market saturation," 
because persons inclined to gamble and the newly-generated gamblers could 
stay in their geographic areas and gamble (known as the "accessibility" 
factor), These real fears escalated in 1991, when it became apparent that 
casino gambling on the California Indian reservations could intercept and 
destroy 10% (and probably impact another 42%) of the "tourists" coming 
from Southern California to Las Vegas and from Nonhem California to 
Reno, Nevada. 89 To combat this trend toward market saturation, the 
Nevada gambling interests immediately looked to expand to Chicago, New 
Orleans, Washington, D.C., and other U.S. population centers.90 
There was one enormous plus which would assist not only the Nevada 
gambling organizations, but also all gambling interests. Once gambling was 
legalized in a state, even in the soft format of a state lottery, a whole new 
SIru(/ure of American Gambling hI I{le Twentieth Cerlfllry, 35 1. Soc. ISSUES, no. 3, 1979, 
at 137. 
86. The term "problem economic gamblers" (PEGs) is not synonymous with the 
sociological definition for "problem gamblers." and thesc lerms should not be confused. 
Kindt. supra note 17, at 60, 77-78. 
87. The percentage of the population who will become compulsive gamblers after 
gambling is "legalized" is 1.5-5%, and the 10% who will become problem economic 
gamblers includes this \.5-5%. !d.; see aho CLOTFELTER & COOK. fit/pm note 7, at 92·94. 
88. The total pcrcenillge of the public which will gamble once gambling is li;galized 
is 52%. See CLOTFELTER & COOK, SIIpra note 7. at 92-94. These percentages are apparent ly 
moving upward as legalized gambling activities continue to gain SOCiological acceptance, 
See Lesieur, srlpra note 66, at 43 (stating movement up from 61% in 1974.71 % of the public 
was gambling by 1989). These percentages refer to the local populations which will 
definitely gamble. The interface between the number of so·called "tourists" which fall into 
these categories vis·a-vis the percentages of the resident population which fall into these 
e3tegories. become convoluted in the e;lSC of Nevada. 
89. See, e,g .. BElTER Gov'T Assoc., STAFF WlIITE PAPER: CASINO GAMBLING IN 
CmCAGO app. R (1992) (copies available from Better Gov't Assoc" Chicago, 111,). 
90. /d. apps. 0, P, Q. 
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gambling public was being generated.91 By enacting legislation which 
stated that legalized gambling was sociologically acceptable (known as the 
"acceptability" factor), the percentages of the public which could be 
persuaded to gamble could be expected to increase by at least 100-6,600% 
to include up to 52% of the total population.92 Despite the new elements 
of the population bei ng introduced to gambli ng. the 1964-1984 proposals to 
enact a California state lottery'H drew large protests from Nevada and its 
gambling interests9-l--even though a lottery was a "softer" form of gambling 
than the segments which were prevalent in the Nevada gambling markets. 
This scenario was compounded by the proposals of the Indian reservations 
in California to initiate various fonus of hard gambling, including casino 
gambling. In other words, the potenti al competition from California was 
becoming too proximate to the traditional market.9S Thereafter, this fear 
of "market saturation" was poignantly emphasized to the Nevada gambling 
interests,9ti because for basically the first time, many Nevada casinos were 
facing long-tenn financial trouble and the national press was aware of this--
as may have been exemplified by some Las Vegas examples. "Old-line 
gambling dens like the Riviera, the Aladdin and the Dunes, once the lai rs 
of high rollers brandishing pinkie rings while running up big losses on the 
tables, all recentl y have been in and out of bankruptcy . ... " 97 By 
comparison, within a year after land-based casino gambling began in three 
Colorado mining towns in 1991, four of the smaller casinos had closed and 
several others were for sale.9s By 1993, of the approximately 100 casinos 
which had opened since 1991, 33 were closed or had been bought by 
competitors."" "Some 50% ... [were] probably losing money. "]OO 
Within 2 years after casino gambling began in Deadwood, South Dakota on 
91. CLOTFELTER & COOK. supra note 7, at 124-25; see also ILL. ECON. COM~fN, 
supra note 41. at 66-67; ILL. ECON. CO~II'" 'K UPDATE 1994. supra note 41. at 17-19: Rose, 
supra note 4. at 66-69. 
92. The range eakl,llation is: (1.5-.77) + .77"'" (52-.77) +.77 = 95%"'" 6.650%. 
93. CLOTFELTER & COOK, si/pra note 7. at 151-54. 
94. See I. Nelson Rose. Current Issues III Gambling Laws. 8 WHm·tEH L. REV. 245, 
251 (1986). 
95. See gtntrally SUBSIDY. supra note 10, al ES-4. 
96. ld.; see also James Coates, Vegas' Tip To Chicago: CasillO is Pamily Fun, CHI. 
TRIB" Apr. 10, 1992, § 1. all. 10, Those casinos which were stilllhriving, and there were 
several, were placing large dollar amounlS into marketing to attracllhe gambling dollars, See 
id. 
97. Coales, Siipra note 96, at 10. 
98. Marj Charlier, The Payoff: Ca.sino Gambling Saves Three Colorodo Towlls But 
the Price Is High, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23. 1992, at AI, A6. 
99. Koselka & Palmeri, srlpm nOle 8. at 70, 71. 
100. Id. at 71. 
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November 1, 1989, half of the casinos were in financial trouble. lol 
Furthermore, only 5 of the 12 Atlantic City casinos were profitable in 
1990102 and by 1991 and 1992, half of the casinos were in financial 
trouble and seven (out of thirteen) had been through bankruptcy.103 
Market saturation was apparentl y not only occurring, but also occurring 
more quickly in those "isolated" community areas with casino gambling. By 
January 1994, three of Iowa's fi ve riverboats had left. 104 Some state 
legislators were becoming disgruntled and disenchanted. l O:5 "We're in a 
race to the bottom with each state requiring the stakes to be raised and taxes 
lowered," says Iowa state representative Roben Rafferty. "We're all now 
competing for a lower class of gambler. the ones who can't afford i1. "U)6 
Even so, Las Vegas still had several thriving casinos, especially those 
casinos which had redirected their marketing efforts toward "children" and 
"families" by providing family entertainment to lure these previously 
unexploited market segments into the casino gambling environment. 
To both the financially troubled and the solven t casinos. the 
handwriting was on the wall, but the solution was fairly obvious. 
UnfoI1unately for the financially troubled casinos, only the solvent casino 
interests had the resources to meet the problem of market saturation by 
expanding into other geographic areas. The solution was for the casinos to 
take their particular forms of gambling as "quickly" as possible lOJ to the 
"largest population" areas possible, particularly to the unex ploited population 
bases. Serend ipitously for the casino interests, by 1993 most states (37 
including Washington, D.C.)lOS had already pre-condi tioned their 
populations to the acceptance of "legalized gambling" by fostering and 
encouraging state lotteries. 
Interestingly, over 25% of the state lotteries were reporti ng declining 
revenues by early 1993,100 which would theoretically be expected not only 
101. I. Nelson Rose, Camlllin!! And rM lAw: 1992 Elections Endlen' FirMs Of Dreams 
14 (1992) (unpublished article, available from I. Nelson Rose. Whi11ier Law School). 
102. ILL. ST. PoUCH, Dlv. 011\1. INvESnoAnoN, INTEU.JGENCE BUR., How CASINO 
GAMBlIJ\"G AFFECTS LAW ENFORCEMENT 13 (Apr. 16, 1992). 
103. Su Rose. supra note 101. :l1 13. 
104. S~(' William Petroski & Ken Fuson. River gamhlmg deoll blow, DI:S MOINES REG .. 
May 28, 1992, al AI, A2. 
tOS. Thomas A. Fogarty, Sttllmboat //love stUII .f, angus IlIwlf/lIkers, DES MOJr"ES REG., 
May 28,1992, al AI, A2; William Petroski, Riverboal casino firm didn·t fUlfill promises, 
DEs MOU~ES REG., May 28, 1992, at A2. 
106. Koselka & Palmeri, supra note 8, at 7\. 
107. Set! generally Rose, sl/pra note 4, at 67-69. 
108. Koselka & Palmeri, supm note 8. at 71; see also Mi ltman, supra note 58, at 2. 
109. Koselka & Palmeri. supra nOle 8, al 71·72 (referencing USA Capilal, a Las Vegas I 
I 
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from saturation of the JOllery markets, but also from the partial migration of 
the gambling dollars to the harder form s of gambling. For example, in 
January of 1994, the 1I1inois Economic and Fiscal Commission reported that 
for the Illinois lottery: 
In FY 1993. total lottery sales declined $64 million, the 
second decline in three years. II cannot be determined at 
this time if the drop was due 10 add it ional competition 
from riverboats. the lack of rollovers in FY 1993. or 
simply a signal that lottery sales have matured and may 
be on the verge of eroding. 110 
Whether this trend in the Illinois lottery continues, it is indicative of what 
would theoretically be expected--particularly the migration of the gambling 
dollar from the "softer" lottery to casino-style gambling. lmerestingly, the 
State of THinois receives approximately 40 cents in tax revenue for every 
dollar spent in the 10ttcry,11l but only 15 cents in tax revenue if that same 
dollar is spent on riverboat gambling. Therefore, by legalizing riverboat 
gambling. the Slate of ruinois may have hurt its pre-existing tax revenues 
from gambling by $40 million (or more),L12 whil e at the same time 
creating more costs to the taxpayers by creating more compulsive 
gamblers. 113 In this context, an Illinoi s candidate for Attorney General, 
Martin Oberman, proposed that "the stale lake over riverboat gambling and 
its estimated gross of $600 million [actually $1 billion] a year and pay a 
10% management fee to boat owners. ,,114 
In any event , by first locating their casinos in large population centers, 
the casino organizations would be virtuany assured of being successful. lLs 
The casinos knew that in any population base (given some variables), the 
starting point for calculating projected gambling dollars was at least 10% of 
investment firm). 
110. ILL. ECON. COMM'N UPOA1l! 1994. supm note 41. at exec. summary. 
111. See 230 ILCS 10113 ( 1992); see also, e.g., Tom Hemande;r:. Sllell Game.' uper,: 
Ctlsino a lasing proposi,ionjor AurQra, BEACON· NEWS (Aurora. III. ), Jan. 27. t992. at AI. 
A5. 
112. The calculation is S64 million - (15 + 40 x $64 million) '" $40 million. 
113. See, e.g. , BETTER Gov'T ASSOC., STAFF WIlITE PAPER: CASINO GAM8Lir.:G IN 
CHICAGO 2, 5, 14 (1992) (copies BVlulablc from BetleT Gov't Assoc .. Chicago. III.). 
114. Tim Landis, Bming dol/aI'S hilling limit.', ROCKFORD REG. STAR (Rockford, III.), 
Feb. 14, 1994, at AI, A2. 
115. See, e.g .• James Popkin & Katia Heuer, America's G(lmbling Cmze. U.S. NEWS 
& WORLD REP., MaT. 14. 1994, at 42, 43; see also "Roll Call America, Section I," American 
Gaming Summit (Dec. 9, 1994) (industry reports on Wisconsin and Michigan) (partial 
transcript available from N. ilL U. L. Rcv.). 
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the public within a certain geographic range as guaranteed problem 
economic gamblers spending 65% of the total gambling dollars.116 The 
two major conditioning factors that the casinos preferred were: (I) being in 
large population bases and (2) being first into the given market area with 
their particular form of gambling. Although pro fonna advertising could be 
conducted 10 attracl 10uriSIS, Ihere would be little incentive initially to 
adyenise beyond the local gcographic markcl, because if the two major 
conditioning factors were substantially satisfied, the gambling facilities 
would probably not need a single tourist to break even, because there would 
be no prohibitions on gambling by local adult citizcns--thereby, draining the 
local population base.ll7 For example. although the 1992 proposal for a 
$2-billion casino complex in Chicago was hyped and sold (0 the public as 
bringing 2 1~26 million l18 "yisits" or tourists1!9 to the Chicago area, most 
of those tourists were coming already'20 and spending their dollars in 
traditional pre-existing bus inesses. In actuality, il appeared that Chicago had 
9.3 million tourists in 1990121 and 3.2 million busi ness visi tors in 
1990. 122 The business visitors for the entire Chicago metro-area were 
projected at approximately 3.9 million for 1991. 123 Overall, only 2.9 
million "new" tourists could be expected. 12• This minor projected influx of 
new tourists raised the problem of the "50*percent rule," which provides 
generally that for a local economy to break even. over 50% of the patrons 
116. SI.'/! CLOTFELTI:R & COOK. supra note 7. at 92·94: su a1.so supra nOles 87 -88 and 
accompanying lex!. 
J 11. See supra nOles 51-57 and accompanying tC:l1. 
118. Slddmore. Owings & Memll. CIITCAGO INTERNATIONAL ENTERTAINMEI'IT CENTER 
4·5 (June 1992) (predict ing 21 to 26 million visits us tot~1 nnnu:t l nllendllllcc but not defining 
"visits" per se as tourists. the local public, or both). 
119. Since 70% of the "visits" were presumably "Out of Town." the tourist estimate is 
probably 15-18 million tourists. The twns and calculations are nebulous. !d. 
120. Sec Deloiltc & Touche. CmCAGO GAMING COM~HSSJON. EcONm11c AND OTHER 
IMPACTS OF A PROPOSED GAM!NG. [!NTERTA!~~IENT A~D HOTEL FACILITY (May 19. 1992). 
121. Id. at 45. 
122. {d. at 50. 
123. 'd. al 51. The 100ai number of tourists :lnd business viSItors for 199 t was 
estimated at 16.8 million. Id. at 6. The subtotals. however. totaled only approximately i3 
million and this 4 million discrepancy is difficult to pinpoint. Su supra nOl:es 11 8-20 and 
accompanying tex!. 
124. See Dcloittc & Touche. supra note 120, at 45-51. Even though this report wus 
criticized as being sponsored by supporters of the casino complex (i.e., Mayor Richard 
Daley), these tourist numbers appear to be ~ecurate. Economically. casillos are a good bel. 
CII. TRIB., May 24. 1992, § 4, at 2 (reporting 2.9 million new visitors to Chicago) 
lhereinafler Economically]. 
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cannot be either from the local population or from pre-existing tourists. m 
Faced with the 50-percent rule, the supporters of Lhe casino complex 
suddenly revised their estimates up to "10.2 million new tourists"l26 __ a 
highly questionable number. It should be noted that Nevada's economy 
receives over 90% tourists from outside the slate, thereby benefiting the 
local economy.127 By comparison, a 1992 report indicated that only two 
(out of seven) casinos in Mi nnesota received more than 50% tourists, and 
tourist patrons of horse racing and the lottery were only 2-3% and 4%, 
respeclively.12& 
Although public infonnalion on tourist palrons for the Ill inois 
riverboats was somewhat sketchy, the Peoria riverboat's own exit polls 
conducted between November 20 and December I, 1991 reported only 44% 
of the patrons were from outside the Peoria area. l19 What proportion of 
these patrons were "new tourists from outside the state" was unclear. 
However, in 1993 the same riverboat released indirect infonnation indicating 
that only approximately 8% of its patrons were from out-of-state1lO (with 
no indication of the proportion of "new" touri sts).lJl The apparently low 
number of "new out-of-state tourists" meant that theoretically the lllinois 
regional economy was not benefiting from this particular facility. 
In similar economic scenarios involving concentrated legalized 
gambling activities, enonnous quantities of the current tourist dollars and 
consumer dollars could be pulled away from the pre-existing economy and 
into the casinos, where those dollars would become part of the new 
125. Su, e.g., John W. Kindt, Sl3tement to the Task Force on Gaming in Jltinois 2-3 
(Apr. 7. 1993). According to Professor William Thompson at the University of Nevada at Las 
Vegas, "When more than 50 percenJ of gambling is by locals ... gambling is a sure loser.~ 
Peter Passell. The False Promise of Development by CasillO, N.Y. TIMES, lune 12. 1994, at 
F5. 
126. Chicago International Entertainment Cenler: News Al A Glance. at 1 (undated) 
(news release. probably fall of 1992, referencing Suite 51 0, 730 N. Franklin SI.. Chicago, Ill. 
6(610) (copy on file with N. Ill.. U. L. REV.) (emphasis added). 
127. Set:, e.g., Hearings, supra note 20, at 5. Set: also 1994 THE WORLD BOOK 
YEARBOOK 398 (sl3ting that there are "more than 80 percent [tourists] in the case of 
Nevada~). 
128. MINN. PLAN. OFF .. HIGH STAKES: GAMBLING IN MINNESOTA 14 (1992) (reporting 
on 7 of 16 casinos) [hereinafter MINN. PLAN. I. It should be noted that in 1993 there were 16 
tribal casinos in Minnesota . MINN. PLAN. OFF .• MINNF.'lOTA GAMBLING 6 (1993). 
129. Hernandez. supra note ill, at 5. 
130. Robert W. Cook. Economic and Fiscal tmpact of Riverboat Gaming in Virginia 
2 (Nov. 1993) (prepared for the Virginia Riverboat Council. a sponsor of riverbOal 
gambling). 
131. Even acadcmics commissioned by the industry have been "not able 10 obtain hard 
data on the number of new tourists." Jd. 
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gambling cycle. Since these dollars would generally be respent on in-house 
marketing gimmicks, cluster services. and more and newer gambling 
paraphernalia, the real resources Jasen would only tend 10 intensify over 
time. Without ever bringing in a single tourist, however, just the local 
population demographics in Chicago were and remained perfect for the 
success of a casino complex. Such success would be at the expense of the 
pre-existing Chicago economy without taking into account the enormous 
drain on the Illinois taxpayers combined with the projected social- welfare 
costs. The salient {X)ints were that tourists were unnecessary and that 
drawing tourists was irrelevant to the financial success of the proposed 
casino complex. 
Unfortunately for the proponents of the casino complex, the 
pre-existing legalized gambling interests in Illinois also understood these 
basic tenets of gambling and the impacts on market saturation. The 
pre-existing "softer" forms of legalized gambling, especially the horse 
tracks. 133 the off-track betting parlors (OTBs),I34 and the riverboat 
gambling interests. os apparently did not want to compete with the 
"harder" forms of gambling represented by typical forms of land-based 
casino gambling,])6 because it was understood that gambling dollars would 
tend to "migrate" from the softer to the harder forms of gambling. 137 This 
migration of dollars and the concomitant reduction in the market shares of 
132. See generally S .... MUELSON. supra note I. at 425 (stating that "gambling does . . 
. absorb timo: and resouTCeS. ~). 
133. See Ill. Horse Racing Act of 1975. 230 ILCS 512. (1992). In 1992, there were 
seven horse racing tracks operating in Illinois: 
(I) Arlington International Racecourse, Arlington Heights, IlL (2) Hawthorne Race 
Course, Cicero, 111.; (3) Sportsman's Park, Cicero. HI.; (4) Fairmount Park, 
Collinsville, 111.; (5) Balmoral Park, Crete. Ill.; (6) Quad-City Downs, East Moline, 
Ill.; and (7) Maywood Park, Maywood, Ill. 
134. As of 1992 the Illinois Horse Racing Act permitted 30 OTBs. By the end of the 
summer of 1991, 21 OTBs were open. ILL, EcON. CO),IM'N, supm note 4 1, at 26, 28; ILL. 
EcoN. COMM'N UPDATE 1994, supm note 4 1, at 6, 12. 
135. Su III. Riverboat Gambling Act of 1990, 230 ILCS lOll (1992). The Illinois 
Riverboat Gambling Aet authorizes 10 gambling riverboats. See genemJ/y Barbara Powell, 
The New Era of Riverboa/ Gambling, 36 FED. B. NEWS & J. 395 (1989). 
136. See, e.g., Peat, Marwick, Mitchell, & Co., EcoNOMtC IMPACT OF LEGALIZED 
CASINO GAMBLING IN NEW YORK STATE AND ITS IMPACT ON EXISTING FORMS OF 
LEGALIZED G .... MBlING (Feb. 1981). 
137. ILL. EcON. COMM·N. supra note 4), at 4J-46, In J992. after only a year of limited 
riverboat gambling, the Illinois "gambling dollarsw were defini tely migrnting from the horse 
tracks to riverboat gambling. For analyses of the elasticity issues involved in gambling 
activities. see Donn R. Pescatrice, The Inelastic Demand/or Wagering, 12 ApPLIED ECON. 
I (1980); Daniel B. Suits, The Elasticity of Demand/or Gambling, XCIII Q.J. ECON. at 155 
(1979). 
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various segments of legalized gambling were reflected in the anticipated 
overall decrease in taX revenues to the state of Illinois. 
[Illinois] Gov. Jim Edgar . . . warned [that] 
legalization of land-based casino gambling could trigger 
a surge in crime, boost law enforcement costs by 
hundreds of millions of dollars and lead to losses of 
existing jobs and slate revenues. 
Edgar predicted the state's overall take from 
legalized gambling would actually drop by nearly $20 
million if the proposed megaprojeci in Chicago ... 
[became] reality. Moreover, additional law enforcement 
and regulatory demands would cost the state as much as 
$60 million per year. 138 
Based on estimates by Mayor Richard M. Daley's 
gambling commission,l39 the stale would realize $82.5 
million in gambling taxes from the casino in its first full 
year. But Edgar said lottery profits likely would drop by 
nearly $35 million, riverboat gambling revenues would be 
cut by about $40 million and horse racing taxes are 
expected to lag by $26 million. 
Further, riverboat gambling revenues could drop even 
more as they lose market share to the megaproject. 140 
Although they historically refused to release their in-house data, the 
legalized gambling organizations indirectly admitted recognizing this 
tendency for the dollars to migrate. 14] Interestingly, the president of 
Circus, Circus, one of the corporate sponsors of the Chicago complex, 
"predicted thai, within five years, riverboat casinos would have saturated 
138. See Terrance W, Gainor, Address at the Annual IAODAPCA Luncheon (May 8, 
1992) at 10 (lAODAPCA stands for Illinois Alcoholism and Other Drug Abuse Professional 
Certification Association). The Illinois State Police estimates that police services for casino-
re late.:!. crime would exceed $100 million per year. /d. 
139. See generally CmCAOO GAMINO CO:-'fMISS10N, REPORT TO THE MAYOR (June 10, 
1992) [hereinafter GAMING COMMISSION). 
140, Press Release, Off. 111. Gov. lames Edgar. "Governor Warns Land-Based Casinos 
Could Bring Crime Surge As Well As Ovcrull Loss Of Jobs And Slate Revenues," Sept. 29, 
1992 at 1-2 (emphasis adde.:!.). 
141. Pa1rick T. Reardon & Rick Pearson, Casino finns lose patience, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 
4, 1992, § 2, at I, 6. 
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their market to such an extent that they would be offering coupons to entice 
cuslomers.,, 142 It should be noted that this five-year time frame 
corresponds to the predicted five years during which gambling o rganizations 
generate their largest revenues and saturate the market. l43 as well as the 
same five-year lime frame for which tax waivers and concessions are 
traditionally sought.]'" 
In Illinois, the Illinois Economic and Fiscal Commission recognized 
that "[a)5 the Stale nears its saturation point. it is likely that competition for 
the gambling dollar will increase among the various forms of 
gambling.,, ]4S The Commission also recognized that the "difficulty. 
lies in determining the degree to which they curren tly compete as well as 
how they will compete in the future, especially when there is very little 
hisrory of competition between the forms of gaming to study."I46 
However, the Commission reported several results that supported the 
"migration" of gambling dollars. For example, the Comm iss ion reported 
that "the racing handle [gross monies wagered] has shifled from on· track to 
off· track wagering, "1.7 as would theoretically be expected. It was also 
concluded that HOTS facilities in close proximity to a ri verboat can c:c.pect 
to sustain a decline in total handle of approximatcly 5·15%.,, 1.8 
Furthermore. in the context of riverboats, "[tJhose tracks in relativel y close 
proximity to riverboats seem to have suffered greater declines, 
approximately 10% to 15% greater than those tracks further from 
riverboats.,,1.9 Also with regard to riverboats, the Commission noted that 
101lery sales decreased in 1991 and 1993 150 and "to the degree the 
competition docs exist between the two forms of gambling, lottery sales 
would likely decrease."m 
These results paralleled a 1994 report by Dr. Robert Lawrence and Dr. 
Robert Thalheimer in the College of Business and Public Administration at 
the University of Louisville.1n This report summarized some general 
142. /d. at 6. 
143. Kindl, SIIIJra nOle 17. at 52 n.3. 
144. [d.; Stt also Reardon & Pearson, supra nOle t41. at 6 . 
145. ILL. EcON. COMM'N UPDATE 1994, supra nOle 41, at 6. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. at exec. summary. 
148. [d. III 8. 
149. /d. 
ISO. [d. III 9. 
151. /d. 
152. Robert G. Lawrence & R1chard Thalheimer, An Economic A"afysis ollhe Effects 
01 Casillo Gamblmg on the Kenlucky Race HQrse Industry (C. Bus. & PUH. ADM I:.'., U . 
Louisville, Jan. 1994). I 
'" 
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trends in some of these issue areas and concluded that the "evidence from 
changes in handle in markets where casinos have recently been introduced • 
. . . produces estimates of -31% to _39%"m declines in the amounts 
wagered at racetracks. Obviously. this impact was "expected to vary 
depending on the location of the casino relative to population centers in the 
racetrack market and to the price and quality of the product being offered 
at the casino re lative to the racetrack." I .54 
It is also interesting to note that the first two Illinois riverboats (and 
one Iowa riverboat) opened in 1991 ncar three pre-ex isting Illinois horse 
tracks, and within ·one year all three of the tracks experienced large 
decreases in the gross monies wagered. m Furthennore, one track, the 
Quad City Downs, requested termination of racing within seven months after 
the opening of a nearby riverboat. 156 These examples simply confirmed 
what was already well-established; specifically, that the dollars tend to 
migrate from the softer to the harder forms of gambling. 151 What is 
surprising was the speed and degree to which the gambling dollars 
moved. '58 
After the JIlinois OTBs had proliferated pursuant to legislation in 1989 
and again in 1991, and after riverboat gambling began operations in 1991, 
those interests monitoring the gambling dollars knew that the 1991 Illinois 
slate lottery revenues decreased by $14 million.m By comparison, the 
California lottery revenues were predicted to decline up to fifty percent in 
1991 and 1992.160 In Illinois, however, the gambling interests also 
recognized that certain Iypes of gambling activi ties tended to take gambling 
dollars from many softer gambling areas--probably including dog tracks in 
nearby geographic areas. 161 Sometimes within a period of only a few 
153. Id. at 58. 
154. !d. 
155. ILL. £CON. CoM~l'N, supra nOle 41, aI44·46: see Reardon & Pellrson, supra nOlI.' 
141. 1I[ 6. 
156. Sec ILl.. Eeol'. CO:\lM'N, supra note 41, al44·45. 
151. /d, at 42-43. 
158. !d. at 4 J -46. 
159. ILL. ECON. CO~ll>l'N, supra nole 41. at 65. These revenues were expected to 
rebound somewh:lt in 1992. but not back to the 1990 level. Id. Revised figures in 1994 
reponed that the drop in 1991 was only S4 million. The lottery rebounded in 1992 by $10 
million. but then fell by $64 million in 1993. tLL. EcoN. COM~fN UPDATE 1994, supra note 
41, at 11. 
160. Virgini:l Ellis. Lolfery Office Expenses Exceed Umif Set by Low. L.A. TIMES, June 
17,1992, § B, at 1.4. 
161. See Cary Spivak, Dog tracb rulming into financial prabJems. MILWAUKEE 
SENTINEL, Muy 26, 1992. § A, a[ 1,9. See generally WIS, GAMINO COM~l'N, 1991 ·92 
ANNUAL REPORT (successor orguni;mtion as of Ol;\. 1, 1992. consoliduling the Wis. Lottery 
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months. it appeared as if the dollars were already transmigrating from the 
softer forms of gambling to the OTBs and riverboats. It also appeared that 
the OTDs and riverboats were opposed to the potential Chicago casino 
complex because they did not want those gambling dollars to move into 
another harder category of gambling; namely, land-based casino gambling 
in Chicago. 
In Wisconsin in 1992. the gambling dollars were already apparently 
migrating from the "softer" forms of gambling such as the five dog tracks, 
which had just received their licenses in 1989, to the "harder" forms of 
gambling such as casino gambling. 161 For example. "[w]hcn the Oneida 
tribe opened its casino near Grecn Bay ... [in 1991 , (he] Fox Va11ey [dog] 
track business dropped about 50% .... ,,16) Statewide in 1992, the 
Wisconsin Legislature Reference Bureau predicted a 32% drop in stale 
pari-mutual tax revenue for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1992.!64 The 
process of market saturation also appeared to be occurring in Ihe Wisconsin 
economy.J0 
Dog Track 
Dairyland 
Kenosha, Wis. 
$1. Croix Meadows 
Hudson. Wis. 
Gencva Lakes 
Delavan, Wis. 
1991 ProfitILoss 
$2.8 million 
($4.3 million)'b6 
($2.4 million) 
Division, Pari ·Mutual Racing Division, Off. of Charitable Gaming, and Off. of Indian 
Gammg) [hereinafter WIS. ANN, REP. 1991-92J; WIS. R ACING BD .. 1991 ANNUAL REPORT 
[hereinafter WIS, ANN. REP. 1991 [; W IS. RACING BD., 1990 ANNUAL REI'OKT [herei narter 
WIS. ANN. RL:p. 1990). Su also IOWA RACING & GAMING CO!\.tM'N, 1993 ANNUAL REPORT 
[hereinafter IOWA ANN. Rp.I'. 1993); IOWA RACING & G AMING COMM'N, 1992 ANNUAL 
REI'OKT [hereina fte r IOWA ANN, REP. 1992J, 
162. Spivak, mpra note 161, at 9. Compare WIS. ANN. REP. 1991-92. SIIPf(I note 161. 
at 12, with WIS. ANN. REI'. 1991. SIIPf(I nole 161. at 20, alld W IS. ANN. REI'. 1990, .wpm 
note 161 , at 24, 
163. Spivak, Sllpra note 161. at 9. Compare WIS, ANN. REI'. 199 1-92, 5IIpm note 161. 
at 12. with WlS. A:-<N. REP, 1991, $/ll' ra nOle 161 , at 20. 
164, Spivak, .tapro note 161, at 9. 
165, frio ComporT WIS, Az,,'N, REP. 1991-92. Slipra nOle 161. at 12 • ..... itlr WIS, ANN. 
REP, J99 1, supra note 161. at 20. 
166. ThIs dog track. opened June 20, 1991 and the calculated loss ~wa5 through 
December 31, 1991. Spivak, supm note 161. at 9. I 
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Kaukauna. Wis. 
Wisconsin Dells 
Lake Delton, Wis. 
($1.3 million) 
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The response of the dog track owners to the increased competition was 
predictable··the owners demanded the legalization of "harder" fonns of 
gambling. Specifically t the track owners argued that "for the tracks to 
survive they need[edJ unlimited simulcasting and the ability to offer the 
same games and gambling machines--that is. blackjack, slot and video 
betting machines--available al Indian casinos."'6& By definition, gambl ing 
must continually become "harder" and/or expand into new population areas 
in order to survive. J~ Business-economic history indicates that this 
expansion process will never stop until the gambling activities are 
recriminalizcd. l 70 Apparently, some governmental officials are beginning 
to realize what really happens with legalized gambling activities, and there 
have been some interesti ng public statements: 
[Fonner Wisconsin] Racing Board Chairman David C. 
Mebane is openly hostile 10 expansion. 
"It looks like these gambling lobbyists and fixers 
want to have casinos and whorehouses on every corner," 
Mebane said. 
Mebane dismisses the track owners' complaints as 
"whining," saying they should put their Lime and money 
into marketing their tracks. 
"All of the people in this business are extremely 
greedy and they want more and more and more all of the 
time," Mebane said. "They're making plenty of moncy 
with the strictest enforcement in the country. 
167. This dog track had ill reali ty, a IlCgative cash flow. ftI. It is perhaps slgllificanr 
that these fillancial problems apparently went unreported and unaddressed by the governing 
stale agency. Su WIS. A~'. REI'. 1991-92, supra note 161; Spivak, supra nOle 161. al 9. 
168. Spivak, supra note 161. Ilt 9. 
169. See Rose, supra note 4, at 67·69. 
170. Id. al 82·83. 
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"The state would be bener off if there wasn't 
gambling at all, ~ Mebane added. "The gambling industry 
and gambling proponents have an insatiable desire to 
corrupt every public office holder they come in contact 
with."'" 
m 
Similarly, Governor Lowell WeickerofConnccticut, "a vocal opponent 
of casino gambling in his home state" m has a standard rejoinder: "I i]f 
you lie down with dogs, you get up with fleas .... ,, 173 These 
observations nrc s imply part of the nonnal processes which occur when state 
legislatures become infatuated with legalizing gambling activities. 
In Iowa, the first state to begin riverboat gambling in 1991. similar 
problems were apparent. 174 State Senator William DieJeman, chairman of 
the Iowa Senate Ways and Means Committee observed, "We are losing 
control of the monster we have created with gambling in this state.',115 The 
1993 Annual Report of the Iowa Racing and Gaming Commission is replete 
with references involving loss of market share between different operations 
conducting casino-style gambling. 176 Of the six authorized riverboats, 
competition apparently caused two riverboats to leave during 1992, onc boat 
to close in 1993, and another boat to struggle for market share. l17 The 
Iowa Commission reponed that only one boat was suecessfu1. ' " With 
regard 10 the three greyhound tracks and Ihe one horse track, the migration 
of the gambling dollars was apparently impacting all of the tracks, wit h 
three of the four racetracks losing money and perhaps facing 
bankruptcy.l19 The tracks' supponers pushed for bu t failed 10 gel several 
new tax concessions for the state 's three dog tracks at Bluffs Run, Dubuque, 
and Waterloo, Iowa, and for the horse track at Prairie Meadows ncar Des 
Moines, Iowa. lIIo This horse track was projected to be fun her subsidized 
by the taxpayers and to remain open during the 1992 "season without having 
171. Spivak. l'upru nOle 161, at 9. 
172. Rita Ko~elka, flow Lowell Weicker mid no to gambling. rOlUlI'.s. Mar. I, 1993, 
at 71. 
173. Id. 
174. IOWA ANN. Rf,l', 1993. rupra nOle 161 , at 1-2: IOWA ANN. REI'. 1992, .wpm note 
161, at J. 
175. 'Loring coI/Il'ol': Without usressmen/ of gambling, e:rpansiOl/ plull persisfl'. 
TELEGRAPH !IF-RAW (Dubuque, Iowa), Mar. 22, 1992, § A, at 4 Ihereinafter Losing cOiltro/l . 
176. IOWA ANN. REP. 1993, supra nole 161, nt 1-2. 
177. ld. at I: Pelroski & Fuson, Sllpra note 104, at AI. A2. See Fogarty, supra note 
lOS, at AI. A2; Pet rosk i, lupra nOle lOS, at A2. 
178. IOWA ANN. REP. 1993, supra nOle 161, at I. 
179. Id. at 2. 
180. /d.: Losi,lg COlltraJ, IlIllra nOle 175, at 4. 
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a single horse circle the track; Prairie Meadows would only simulcast 
races."IBL In fact, Prairie Meadows did not have live horse racing from 
the summer of 1991 until May of 1993. 182 As Iowa State Senator Linn 
Fuhrman summarized the problem of legalized gambling, "Enough is 
enough,,,I83 
In Minnesota, a study sponsored by the state strongly suggested that 
U.S. market saturation was beginning to occur--particularly with regard to 
land-based casino gambling. 'u Once the Indian casinos opened near 
Minneapolis-St. Paul, many of the 7,675 passengers in 1989 who had flown 
to Atlantic City from the Twin Cities were captured by the local gambling 
market.l8~ Only 1,556 passengers flew to Atlantic City in 1990 and by 
1991 the number of passengers was zero.l86 Similar declines in flights to 
other out-or-slate gambling destinations were also documented for the years 
1989 to 1991. 111 The "accessibility" of the Indian casinos, as well as their 
social "acceptability," were cutting into the traditional casino markets .l8S 
Even so, these new Indian casinos were also creating a new market of 
compulsive gamblers and problem economic gamblers, and thereby, 
substantially increasing the socio-economic COSls to the State of Minnesota. 
However, in another development, the Illinois state government finally 
recognized in 1992 what the internal data of the legalized gambling interests 
had revealed years earlier: specifically. that every local and state economy 
has an overall "market saturation point" for gambling dollars. The overall 
data of the lllinois Economic and Fiscal Commission implied: 
a saturation point where the introduction of a new form of 
gaming no longer increase[d) spending for wagering. 
This saturat ion point ... [was] difficult to project because 
most of the states that have legalized new forms of 
gambling were already below the national averages for 
spending on wagering .... Moreover. the saturation point 
probably varies for each state. Illinois may be close to 
the saturation point as ... [1992 wagering in lllinois was} 
above the national average, above the national average for 
181. Losing con/rQl, Sllpra note 175. at 4; see IOWA ANN. REP. J993 . sllpra note 161, 
at 2; IOWA ANN. REP. 1992. lllprn note 161, at I. 
182. IOWA A.'IN. REP. J993. supra note 161. at 2. 
183. Losing control. supra note 175. at 4. 
184. Su MINN. Pu.N., supra nOle 128, at 16-17. 
185. Id. at 16. 
186. ld. 
187. MINN. Pu.N., supra note 128, at 16. 
188. Stt Rose, supra note 101, at 15. 
1 
S 
It 
D 
" 
'" 19 
'y 
to 
"' eir ,. 
of 
by. 
)ta. 
u'y 
~ts 
,my 
:rall 
Ie 161, 
LEGAUZED GAMBUNG AND MARKU SliTURATION 
the Midwest, as well as other geographical regions, and 
above the average for states which offer[ed] (he same 
forms of gaming. l19 
299 
Unfortunately, the governmentaJ officials were still being misdirected in the 
debate. The goals seemed to be a question of how much could be drained 
out of the pre-exisling economy of the state and which of the legalized 
gambling interests would get most of the money. Apparently. little or no 
thought was being given to the strategic economics of overall losl jobs and 
lost consumer dollars. as well as the projected increases in tax rates, cri me 
rates, court costs, incarceration costs, social welfare costs, and associated 
costs. 
Given the undue hastc with which the casinos were proposed and which 
rcsulled in the resignation of the original chair of Mayor Daley's Chicago 
Gaming Siudy for alleged connicls of interest. l90 the Illinoi s Economic 
and Fiscal Commission did not have the lime 10 analyze land-based casino 
gambling as part of its 1992 report, Wagering In Illinois . 191 Even so, the 
Commission had examined potential impacts of riverboat casi no-gambling 
in the Cook County area which "could cause a 10-15% declinl! in racing 
handle in that vicin ity, and less decline as distance grows."t'¥.! Arguendo. 
this supports the observation that the gambling dollars tend to migrate to 
harder forms of gambling, and emphasizes the anxiety of the various 
legalized gambling interests for guaranleed "geographic dislribulion.',t91 
In another example, Ihe Fiscal Commission estimated that an Illinois 
·video louery would generale $185 million in profits, offsel by ... [a] $98 
million loss 10 Ihe slate louery .... " I IM "In South Dakola, every dollar 
189. ILL. EcON. COMM'N, supra nOle 41, at 15. 
190. Ali Siewers. Disarmy of panel blamed on hasle, Cin. SUN·TIMES, Apr. 12, 1992, 
at 67. 
Id. 
Critics of !he mayor's gambling Commission said the resignation of its 
(hainnan Friday ovcr a potcntial conflict of intcresl underscores concern thai 
Mayor Daley is rushing too fast in a move to legalize casinos. 
Meanwhile, an attorney for the Commission said it will bar lhe public 
from some mectings. 
(The] Commissioo Chairman ... announced that he was resigning because 
a 35·acre trnCt nonh of Grant Park estate co-owncd by his company may be offcred 
as a casino site. 
191. Iu.. EcoN. CoMM'N, supra note 41, al 7. 
192. Id. at 3 (emphasis added). 
193. Su id. 
194. Id. The: following table indicatcs video IOllcry's projectcd impact on the lottery. I 
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spent on video lottery represented a 25% decrease in instant ticket sales, for 
ESTIMATED IM PACT OF VIDEO LOTTERY 
Ikfore Estimated After OIange 
Estimated Estimated Cannibalil.ation Estimated Estimated ;, 
~ G~. Nel Rc\'cnue Fa(tOl'S Gmss Nd Revenue ~ Daily $385.0 
Picl::4 $ 115.0 
Lo"o $610.0 
LiUiI: LottO $140.0 
Instant $430.0 
Subtotal SI.680.0 
Vidcc:l 
"'A 
TOTAL $1.680.0 
Tallie NOlcs; 
$143.7 IS" $327.3 
S 42.6 I'" $ 97.8 52 16.3 10'Jl $549.0 
S SO.9 " .. $119.0 $136.4 
"'" 
$)01.0 
S390.0 51.394.0 
NIA 51.574.0 
$590,0 53,968.0 
LOSS TO LOlTER Y ::: 598.1 
STATE NET GAIN ",$87.2 
S122.1 
S 36.2 
$194.7 
S 43 _3 
S 95.S 
S491.9 
5185.3 
$677.2 
The (ollowing aS5urnplions were made in arriving al thc estimate: 
-$21.6 
-$6.4 
-$21.6 
-$7.6 
-$40.9 
-598.1 
S185.3 
SIt7.2 
L The net State revenue of the IOllery before {he introduction of video louery is 
$590 mi llion. 
2. Each of the lottery games would be affected by the following e.:mnibaliUltion 
faclors (eannibalization factors are the estimated percent decrease in gross ticket 
sales) 
Game C.1nnibali7~1Iion 
Daily ,,% 
Piek·4 ,,% 
Lotto 10% 
Linle Lotto ,,% 
Instant 30% 
3. Video lonery tenninah (45.000) would experience II SI.IOO per week gross 
resu lting in a lotal annual gross of $2.574 billion. South Dakota is currently 
experiencing a gross of $1,070 per weck. 
4. A State tax rate of 20% applied 10 the net machine income (net machine 
income: tota l played minus 64% walk·away :: 36%). 
Id. at 74. 
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a total decrease (erosion) in instant {lottery game] sales of 35_40%."195 
These examples not only confirmed that gambling dollars generally tend to 
migrate to harder forms of gambling, but also raised the spectre that the 
process leading to market saturation was accelerating,llI6 particularly in 
Illinois and South Dakota. "Some of those involved in the gambling 
industries fear that Illinois is at or near the saturation point for spending on 
wagering." l!n 
To combat the casino interests, the OTBs and horse racing interests 
commissioned a study and hired experts who indicated that the horse racing 
interests would lose 20-30% of their wagers (handle) to the casinos.19s 
These results paralleled those of the Illinois Economic and Fiscal 
Commission, which predicted that in a similar hypothetical case of Chicago 
riverboat gambling, instead of lllnd-based casino gambling, 10-15% or more 
of the handle of nearby racetracks would be IOS1. 199 Dy comparison, a 
1981 study by Peat, Marwick, Mitchell, and Company "determined that the 
markets for on-track belting and casino gambling overlapped and, if 
authorized [in New York state I. casino gambling would have a negative 
impact on on-track beuing."200 It was projected that the New York race 
tracks would experience an overall 13% decline in altendance and a 20% 
decline in the amounts w<lgered}OI Professor Richard Thalheimer's study 
of New Jersey cas ino gambling reported that the race tr<lcks experienced a 
195. 'd. al 73. 
196. Id. at 42-46. The speed wi th which market saturation was apparently occurring 
in some local economies was within one year. and it could easily be argued that the Illinois 
communities in question wcre already saluruled. ld. 
197. Id. al 7. 
198. The study sponrored by the proponents of the Chicago cllsino comple)!; admitted 
thai Ihe Illinois horse racing interests could see a revenue decline of 20-30% oncc the 
Chicago casinos were in operation. Deloine & Touchc, supra nolc 120. at 204-05. See 
glmemlly GAMING COMMISSION. supra note 139. Economics Professor William Bryall of the 
University of Illinois and Director of the Burenu of Economic and Ou~iness Re!>Carch 
calculated "a 25 percenl loss of handle to the racing industry." ReF. INC .• EfFEC11> OF 
CHICAGO CASINOS ON nlE HORSE RACING INOUSlR'i. 2 (May 26. 1992) lhereinaflcr RCF]. 
According 10 Deloilte and Touche. the Ill inois riverbo:lls would still Hprospcr,'· but "the 
horse-rocing industry could suITer a 20 percent 10 30 percent decrease in revenue. " 
&tmomically, .fupra note 124. al 2; set R. Bruce Dold. How Chic(lgtJ should ellt the cards. 
Qn. Eh'TERPRISE. May 1992. al 7. In a similar scenario which had occum.:d earlier in 
Nebraska, skeptics claimed that the Nebraska legislature ~w:lnted to protcCt CllSlCm 
Nebraska's only horse-racing Irack from competition: so 10 communities were banned from 
operating video games. Id. 
199. ILL. ECON. COMr.l'N, supra nOle 41. aI42-43. 
200. ld. at 41. 
201. ld. at 42. 
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7% decline in attendance and a 34% decline in the amounts wagered per 
person in 1988,202 The New Jersey lottery. initiated in 1971, had caused 
the racetracks to experience a 17% decline in the gross monies wagered.2lIl 
In the Chicago scenario. the three companies promoting the casino 
complex released a study which they had commissioned and which argued 
that the migration of dollars from the racetracks would only be 4%,204 and 
when that argument did not persuade the horse racing interests, the casino 
interests started making legitimate proposals "to cut the horse racing 
interests in on the action."w Furthennore. it is perhaps significant that 
the study concluded that "[o]nly about [10% of) patrons surveyed at 
Arlington International Racecourse would go to the tracks less frequently if 
land-based casinos were in Chicago."206 when it is remembered that this 
10% of patrons could easily represent 33% of the gambl ing dollars. 201 In 
this context, Illinois State Senator Laura Kent Donahue indicated after the 
t 992 spring hearings of the Illinois State Legislature that it was obvious that 
to get the casino complex, the casino interests would promise anything to 
anybody.208 This observation was affirmed by the lobbying efforts of the 
casino interests during the 1992 fall legislative session. During the fall 
session, Illinois State Senator Enrlean Collins of Chicago also indicated that 
the projected social costs were of great concern despite the promises of the 
202. Stt An Analysis Of Thc Impact Of Intra-St3te Intertraek Wagering. A State 
Lottcry And Casino Gambling On ParimulUal Horse Race Wagering: New Jersey--An 
Expanded Analysis, v, 30 (1992) (reporting data or R. Thalheimer. Univ. of Louisville) 
(hereinafter Wagering); ILL. EcoN. COMM'N, supra nme 41, at 42. 
203. Wagcring, supra note 202. at v, 30. 
204. RCF, supra note 198, at I (cri tiquing the study pamphlet). The sample size is 
quite small. This pamphlet reneets a typical -battle of thc expertS. - Id. at 2. This pamphlet 
was apparently paid for by the three companies sponsoring the Chicago casino complex. Ra) 
Long, Arlington would lose few patrO/IS, study finds. CHI. SUN-TIMES. May 19. 1992. at 5 
[hereinafter Study finds]. It is interest ing to note that this newspaper article predates by 7 
days the actual pamphlet to which it cites. 
205. Ill. St. Sen. Laura Kent Donahue. Statement before the Quincy Citizens Forum 
(Oct. 11. 1992). 
206. SlIIdy finds. supra note 204. at 5. 
207. Su supra nmes 17, 87·88 and accompanying text. 
208. Donahue. supra note 205. Su gtn~rafly Spielman. supra note 42. at 1. 34. Tom 
Strong. Chicago may get riverboat casinos (AP), NEwS~GAZETTE (Champaign. Ill.), Dec. 5, 
1992, § A, at 6. ~Casino backers are busy writing amendments to the casino bill in an cffon 
to satisfy opponents." Rosemary T. Garhart, Wail until spring, NEWS-GAZETTE (Champaign. 
111.), Dec. 2, 1992, § A, at 4. 
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casino inlerests. 209 This concern was echoed by an influential Illinois 
public interest coalition, specifically the Public Welfare Coalition.210 
The casino interests indicated to the Stale of Illinois that they could "be 
persuaded" to build a $2-billion euphemistically-named "Family 
Entertainment Center" in Chicago and to guarantee that only 20% of the 
Center would be devoted to casino gambling2ll --although they apparently 
declined to build anything at all without the gambling component212 
(which should tell the public something).2IJ The gambling interests were 
obviously promising "everything [0 everyone," which undermined their 
credibility. Some of the lobbying efforts of the casino interests were also 
challenged by Illinois Common Cause as being ilIegal.21• and leHers of 
complaint were sent by Common Cause to JIlinois Attorney General Roland 
Burrism and Cook County State's Attorney Jack Q'Malley.116 
Given these scenarios, there were quest ions involving what motivated 
the casino interests 10 be so driven and so careless in their lobbying 
activities. The answer was largely economic: "Government-regulated casino 
and slot machine operations, with li mited licenses for operators, can be 
immensely profitable. ,,217 For example. in 1990 Circus, Circus, one of the 
sponsors of the Chicago casinos, had opened the Excalibur hotel in Las 
209. See Interview with Ill. 51. Sen. Earlean Collins. WAND-Channel 17 (Decatur. 111.). 
(Nov. 30. 1992) (following the III. Senate hearings on the Chicago Casino Proposal). 
210. See 8tntrofly Press Release. Public Welfare Coalition. ~Anti·Casino Groups Call 
For Maintaining Chicago's Social Fabric,~ June 8. 1993 (Chicago. 111.). 
211. See 8eneroll), Skidmore, supra noll: 118. at 4. 10 . 
212. !d. For eJUlmples of concerns associated with this issue, see GAMING CO:>'lMISSION, 
supra note 139, at 16-17. 70, 74-75. 
213. rd. See supra notcs 53·67 and accompanying text. 
214. The alleged violations involved the l11inois Lobbyist Registration Act, 25 ILC5 
17011-170112 (1992). The complaints of Il linois Common Cause wcre enumerated in a press 
release. Press Release. ·Common Cause Calls for Investigation into Casino Violations of 
Lobby LaW.M Aug. 5. 1992 (copy on file with 111. Common Cause. Chicago. 111.) [hereinafter 
Common Cause Investigation]. First, Common Cause alleged that contrary to chapter 63, 
paragraph 173 of the statute. the sponsors of the casino ~had several individuals lobbying 
legislators who were not registered with the Secretary of State as required by law. - ld. at 
I. Secondly, contrary to chapter 63. paragraph 176, it was claimed that the casino sponsors 
had "not filed proper e;\:penditure repons." rd. Thirdly. Common CJuse suggested that the 
"evidence points to the use of other registered lobbyists who have not declared Icgalized 
gambling as a represented interest." contrary to chapter 63, paragraph 175(c). Id. 
215. Letter from Tracy Litsey. E;\:ccutive Director. 111. Common Cause, to Roland 
Burris. Ill. AU'y Gen'!. (Aug. 5, 1992) (on liIe with III. Common Cause, Chicago. III.). 
216. Letter from Traey Litsey. Executive Director. 111. Common Cause. to Jack 
O'Malley. Cook County. III. State Att'y. (Aug. 5. 1992) (on file with 111. Common Cause, 
Chicago, IlL). 
217. Htaring, supra note 4, at 61 (statement of Professor Roben Goodman). 
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Vegas, as the largest hotel in the country, but by fall of 1991 "the company 
stunned market analysts by announcing it had already paid off the Excalibur 
mortgage from operating revenues."2J8 A gambling establishment which 
could generate this sc;tie of revenues while the United States was in a 
recession should frighten the pre-existing Chicago businesses with the 
spectre of economic cataclysm, because those pre-existing businesses would 
be in direct competition for most of the local consumer dollars being 
spiraled into the casinos. Field research indicates that from a conservative 
perspective, most of the dollars going into the proposed casinos could 
constitute a total drain out of the Chicago economy. This statistic presumes 
that the casines are making their best efforts to attract tourists who would 
not otherwise be traveling to Chicago. For the casinos to "imply" that they 
would attract enormous numbers of new tourists per year219 to the Chicago 
area is unsubstantiated--particularly since "market saturat ion" has been 
occurring in several gambling jurisdictions across the country. Using the 
casinos' own base-line data,no the casinos would definitely take 1.25 
million tourists of the normal pre-existing tourists from other tourist 
attractions221 and businesses and would "strongly attract" an additional 
5.25 million away from other businesses.2!'.! 
In 1984, for example, ten Nebraska communities with legalized 
gambling via video-machines became saturated and their economies declined 
(regardless of the large social costs), and thereafter, the Nebraska legislature 
banned their video-machine gambling.223 In this instance, the rapid 
economic impacts. including the illusion of bona fide local tax revenues, 
were to be expected, because video-machine gambling is widely-known as 
"the crack~cocaine" for creating new compulsive gamblers amongst the 
general public, 
The base-line principle is that because of eventual "market saturation" 
gambling has to keep finding new competitive advantages to survive within 
the gambling environment. Historically, these competitive advantages are 
larger than those typically granted to or enjoyed by more traditional 
businesses. Critics of legalized gambling suggest that one of the most 
insidious and well~hidden unfair competitive advantages which the legalized 
21&. Coates, supra note 96. at 10 (emphasis added), 
219. Skidmore, supra note 118, at 4·5. 
220. See supra notes 30, 121 ·22 and accompanying text. 
221. Id, For example, the 1990 baseline c.1lculation would be: (93 million tourists + 
3,2 million business visitors) x 10 percent == 1.25 million, 
222, /d, For example, the 1990 baselinc calculation would be: (9.3 million tourists + 
3,2 million business visitors) x 42 percent"" 5.25 million, 
223, Dold, supra notc 198, at 7. 
• 
• 
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gambling organizations are usually granted consists of disproportionately 
large direct and indirect tax breaks.224 In many ways, taxpayer dollars 
directly and indirectly subsidize the legalized gambling interests.m 
One of the most authoritative 1994 non-industry studies was conducted 
by the Florida Department of Commerce and the Florida Division of 
Tourism which analyzed the research from across the United Slates.226 
The report. Implications OJ Casino Gambling As An Economic Development 
Strategy,221 noted thai as of 1994 there were 24 states that had authorized 
casino-style gambling and that "by the year 2()(x}, 95% of all Americans . 
. . [were] expected to live withi n a 3-4 hour drive from a casi no."m 
Accordingly, "market saLuration" by casino·style gambling was identified as 
a concem.229 Interestingly, the Florida Department of Commerce 
emphasized a study indicating that "being able to gamble" was "a low 
motivator of tourism by Americans (18%).,,2)0 This Department of 
Commerce also questioned the credibility of several standard industry claims 
in this issue area23! and then summarized the authoritat ive research as 
follows: "Evidence suggests that casino gambling would not bring in new 
dollars or tourists, but instead exploit what already exists in the state. A 
consistent result of the introduction of casino gambling has been the 
cannibalization of pre·existing tourism industry.,,212 
224. Su, ~.g .. Kindt, supra nOle 17. at 52 n.3; H~aring, supra nOie 4. at 77; Rock 
IslaJUi giv~s tax rebate 10 floundering rivubool casino. (AP). JOURNAL COURIER 
(Jacksonville, Illinois), June 28. 1995. at I; Rod: Island to gil'e casino tax break. (AP), 
JOURNAL STAR (peoria. Illinois), June 28, 1995. at 86. 
225. Id. 
226. Fu.. DEP'T COM. REPORT, supra nOle 4; see Fla. Dep't Com. Press Release, supra 
note 4. at I. 
227. Fl.A. DEP'T COM. REPORT, supra note 4. 
228. !d. at 3; see id. at 6. 
229. Id. 
230. Fla. Dep't Com. Press Release. supra note 4. at 9 (citing the 1994 National Travtl 
Monitor by Yankelovich Research). 
231. TIle Florida Department of Commerce addressed some of the casino-industry's 
claims as follows: 
Proponents say casinos would boost tourism through incremental rises in the 
number of visitors, the length of their stays in Florida and reduction of Floridians' 
traveling out of state for casino gambling opportunities. Despite analysis of in-
state and national casino research. the Department has been able to find no tinla 
10 suppa" these claims and sr.bstalrt;ol research and documentaliolr /hat refutes 
thLm . 
FLA, DEP'T COM, REPORT, supra note 4, at 2 (emphasis added). See also Hearing. supra 
note 4. at 57 (statement of Professor Robert Goodman) (Decision makers ~shooid avoid 
reliance on information by researchers who wor!< for pro-gambling constituencies. ~). 
232. Fla. Dep't Com, Press Release, supra note 4, at J (emphasis added). 
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Despite the concerns involving market saturation expressed by 
individual slates and even the legalized gambling industry, the U.S. national 
economy is so large that it has the ability to inculcate various and numerous 
legalized gambling activities before and after the year 2000. Some locales 
could allow overbuilding in relation to the potential market for gambling 
dollars,233 but overall saturation of the U.S. market appears unlikely for 
the foreseeable future.234 As governments continue to embrace legalized 
gambling activities for the initial tax revenues generated and to ignore the 
enonnous social and economic costs which will eventually arise 10 haunt 
them, issues involving market saturation will probably pale in significance. 
These governments are developing new partnerships with 
businesses in some of the most unproductive and 
destructive sectors of the economy, helping to expand an 
industry whose success increasingly depends on 
cannibalizing dollars from other businesses and whose 
expansion will create serious future problems for other 
businesses and governments to deal with. 
State and local governments have in effect created a 
regressive industrial policy with the gambling 
induslry.m 
233. Gary Putka, New England Stares Step Up Wagering On New Casinos. WALL ST. 
J .. Sept. 2, 1994, at A2. New England's si1t slales are "far from over~tuT3lion" according 
10 the chairman of Capi!'1l Gaming International. [d. "Fo1twoods' revenue (gamblers losses) 
will reach $1 billion" in 1994 according 10 a reported analysis by Arthur D. Little and Co., 
but the analyst: 
Id. 
notes that the projected new jobs at each [proposed] casino won't be a net gain for 
the region, as many will come at the expensc of attractions that will lose revenue 
to gambling. Of the $4.1 billion in gambling revenue that Little sees under its most 
cxpansive scenario, . .. [the analyst] reckons that 50% to 90% would be spent 
regionally even if the casinos weren't built. 
234. 'The market will have \0 double and double again before the market gets close \0 
saluration, according to ... [industry insidersr at the November 1994 Riverboat Gaming 
Congress and E1tposilion held in New Orleans. Ed Bierschenk. AnalYSIS say casino market 
not saturated, ST. JOURNAL-RE.01STliR (Springfield, 111.), Nov. 19, 1994, at 5. 
235. Hearing. supra note 4, at 64 (statement of Professor Robert Goodman). 
